Social cognitive abilities and social functioning in children with Asperger’s Disorder: a comparison with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder by Allen, Sarah Levin
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social cognitive abilities and social functioning in children with Asperger’s 
Disorder: A comparison with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Faculty 
of 
Drexel University 
by 
Sarah Levin Allen 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
in Psychology  
May 2010 
ii  
 
Acknowledgments 
 I would like to thank my mentor at Drexel University, Douglas Chute, as well as 
the members of my committee for their support, guidance, and dedication to my 
education. I would also like to thank Daniel LeGoff for his supervision and commitment 
to my clinical and research interests. Thank you to all the staff at the CNNH for their 
assistance with this project, especially Mark Mintz and Pnina Mintz. I would also like to 
thank my husband and family for their support, both personally and professionally, 
during the years of my doctoral program. Finally, thank you to all the children and their 
families who participated in this project. Your dedication to research in the area of 
children with Autistic Spectrum disorders is extraordinary. 
iii  
Table of Contents 
LIST OF TABLES..…………………………………………………………………….…v 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………vi 
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………..vii 
1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW……..……………………….1 
1.1    The Development of Social Functioning…………………………..........1 
1.1.1   Social Behavior in children with Autistic Spectrum     
Disorders………………………….………….…2 
1.2     Development of Social Cognition.………...…….………...……………3 
1.3     Tasks measuring Social Cognition……...………………………………7 
1.3.1 “Sally and Anne” False Belief Task…….……..…7 
1.3.2   “Ice Cream Van” story.……………………..…….9 
1.3.3    Happe’s “strange stories”…….…………………10 
1.3.4   “Mind in the Eyes Test”…………………………10 
1.3.5    Faux Pas Task…...……………………………....12 
1.4     Social Cognition of Children on the Autistic Spectrum..……………..12 
1.4.1 Social Cognition and Social Functioning in  
children with AS……………………..…………13 
1.5      Summary and Rationale……...……….………………………………15 
    1.5.1 Social Cognition of Children with ADHD…..…16 
1.5.2 Social Functioning of Children with ADHD...…17 
1.6      Purpose……...…………….………….……………………………….18 
1.6.1 Hypotheses..………..……………………………19 
  
2. METHOD………………………………………………………………………21 
 
2.1     Participant Recruitment……………………………………………….21 
2.1.1   Children with AS..................................................21 
2.1.2   Children with ADHD........................................... 21 
2.1.3   Typically Developing Children.............................21 
2.2     Measures................................................................................................23 
2.2.1 Mind in the Eyes Task……………….…………23 
2.2.2 Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale- II……....….24 
2.2.3 Social Skills Rating System.……………………25 
2.2.4 WASI…………………………………………....26 
2.2.5 BRIEF……………………...……………………27 
2.3     Procedure……........…………………………………………………...27 
2.5     Data Analysis…........…………….……………………………………28 
  
3. RESULTS……………………………………………………………..….……31 
                   3.1     Group Comparison.…....….......………………………………………31 
iv  
3.2     Preliminary Analyses............………………………………………….32 
3.2.1   Measures..…………………………....…………32 
3.2.2  Determination of Covariates…..………….....….32 
3.3     Hypothesis Testing.…...…….......…………………………………….33 
 3.3.1   Hypothesis 1….....…………………...…………33 
3.3.2  Hypothesis 2…..…...……......………………….34 
3.4     Exploratory Analyses....…...........…………………………………….34 
3.4.1   Exploratory Hypotheses.………………….....….34 
3.4.2   Variables of Interest.....……………....…………35 
 
4. Discussion……………………………………………………………….……35 
 
4.1    Limitations……….…...….......……………………………………….39 
4.2    Implications….......……......………………………………………….43 
4.3    Summary and Conclusions...….......………………………………….44 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES.………………...……………………………………………...45 
FIGURES………………………………………………………………………………...53 
APPENDIX 1: Eligibility Questionnaire………………………..……………..…..…….63 
 
v  
 
List of Tables 
 
 
 
1. Demographic Information…………………….. ……………….……………………..54 
 
2. Descriptive Statistics and t-test for children with AS, ADHD, and Typicals on       
variables of interest (NOTE: Typicals not included in analysis…… ..…...…….………..55 
 
3. Correlations………………………………………………………….……………..….56 
 
4. Multiple Stepwise Regressions table for hypothesis testing…...…………….…….….57 
 
6. Partial Correlations for Mind in the Eyes Performance and Dependent Variables  
Controlling for Age and Group……………………..…...……………………….………58 
  
 
 
vi  
List of Figures 
 
 
 
1. Development of Theory of Mind Time Line………….……….……….…………59 
 
2. Revised version of Mind in the Eyes test……………..………………….………..60 
 
3.  Social Functioning and BRIEF scores…............................................……………61 
 
4.  Mind in the Eyes Performance.............................................……………………..61 
 
5.  Correlation between Mind in the Eyes and Age………………………………….62 
 
 
 
 
vii  
 
Abstract 
 
Social cognition and social functioning in children with Asperger’s Disorder: A 
comparison with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
Sarah Levin Allen, M.S. 
Douglas Chute, Ph.D.  
Objective: The current literature has linked the ability to understand one’s own 
mental states with theory of mind, inferring another’s mental states.  It is suggested that 
children with Asperger’s Disorder (AS) are delayed in the acquisition of social cognitive 
abilities (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1991), which may relate to social behavior (Baron-Cohen, 
1985, 1991). Other children with social deficits, such as those with Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), demonstrate poor social functioning due to 
performance deficits and not deficits in underlying social cognitive abilities (see Landau 
& Moore, 1991). This research investigated the relationship between social cognitive 
abilities and social functioning and attempted to demonstrate a link between social 
cognitive abilities and social functioning in children with AS. Method: Children with AS 
and ADHD (7-12 years) were recruited from a private practice; typically developing 
children were recruited by participant referral and advertisements. Children completed 
the Mind in the Eyes Child Version and a two-subtest WASI, if needed. Parents 
completed the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale –II Socialization Domain, the Social 
Skills Rating System (SSRS), and the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function 
(BRIEF) parent report. Demographic information was also collected. Results: Children 
with AS demonstrated poorer Mind in the Eyes performance and social functioning 
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overall, followed by children with ADHD and typically developing children. Findings of 
poorer performance on the Mind of the Eyes task in children with AS compared to 
children with ADHD approached significance. Children with AS displayed significant 
deficits in areas of interpersonal relationships and play and leisure skills, but 
demonstrated similar coping skills as children with ADHD. Both ADHD and AS groups 
performed more poorly than controls on measures of social functioning. Conclusions: 
Results do not support a relationship between social functioning and mental state 
attribution. It is suggestive of an overlap in the type of social deficits experienced by 
children with AS and ADHD.  This research adds to the research on mental state 
attribution for children with AS and ADHD and has implications for those conducting 
social skills training with children, as there may be a need to include methods for 
generalizing social skills related to mental state attribution.  
1  
1.  Introduction and Literature Review 
The Development of Social Functioning  
 
Research has delineated a typical developmental path of social cognition that 
begins before the age of two years and continues throughout early adolescence. The 
ability to look in the direction of another’s pointing or gazing along with the ability to 
infer another’s mental states have been demonstrated as abilities that must exist before 
one is able to mentally attribute (i.e. to tell what another person is thinking or feeling). 
Previous research has suggested that there may be a link between social cognitive 
abilities and social functioning in some populations. Children with psychological 
diagnoses can be at risk for experiencing deficits in social behavior or social functioning 
(i.e. the way a child performs in a social environment). Impaired social functioning has 
been an associated feature of children diagnosed with ADHD, Learning Disorders, 
Autistic Spectrum Disorders, Language Disorders, and Anxiety Disorders, for example 
(APA 1994). Children with Asperger’s Disorder (AS) are delayed in the acquisition of 
abilities needed for the recognition of false beliefs, the understanding of emotions and 
cognitions in others, the ability to recognize social faux pas (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1991, 
1999), and also, by definition, impaired in social functioning. Yet, other children with 
social functioning deficits, such as those with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD), are thought to demonstrate poor social functioning due to performance deficits 
and not deficits in the underlying social cognitive abilities or social skills (see Landau & 
Moore, 1991). Therefore, the contributing factor to the social problems shown by 
children with these diagnoses may be different, just as the nature of the social deficit is 
most likely different.  
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Social Behavior in Children with Autistic Spectrum Disorders.  Deficits in social 
functioning (APA, 1994; Klin, Volkmar, & Sparrow, 1992) and social interactions 
(Baron-Cohen, 1985,1989; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Happe, 2003) are some of the 
defining characteristics of an Autistic Spectrum Disorder. Klin and colleagues (1992) 
investigated the social deficits found in persons with Autistic Disorder (AD) by looking 
at adaptive functioning. The authors used the Socialization Domain of the Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scales Survey Form, which is the most frequently used measure of 
adaptive functioning (Luiselli et al., 2001). Klin, Volkmar, and Sparrow (1992) tested the 
scale’s ability to differentiate people with AD from typically developing controls. Nine 
questions were found to correlate with a diagnosis of AD, six of which were reported to 
occur before the age of 8 months. Children with AS and AD tend to show more deficient 
scores on the Socialization domain compared to other areas of adaptive functioning on 
the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (Volkmar & Klin, 2000).  
It has also been shown that children with AS show exaggerated social behaviors, 
while children with Autistic Disorder appear withdrawn (Volkmar et al., 1982). For 
example, children with AD may not converse with others. Children with AS, however, 
can be verbose about a topic of restricted interest, and conversations are typically one-
sided. Parents of children with AS have reported concerns relating to their children’s 
conversational skills, social-emotional reciprocity, and peer relationships (Knott et al., 
2006). For example, vocal patterns in children with AS may be affected including odd 
prosody, rate, and volume of speech (Volkmar & Klin, 2000). In addition, children with 
AS may be interested in acquiring a relationship (i.e. a girlfriend or friend) but have 
difficulties contacting and maintaining relationships with peers (Volkmar & Klin, 2000).  
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Children with AS report difficulties with social engagement and anger management as 
well as problems with social competence that impact peer relationships (Knott et al., 
2006).  
Studies of social cognition in those with AD or AS  include research on self-
recognition, self-awareness, recognizing emotions and cognitions in others, and belief 
attribution. It has been suggested that social cognition may be necessary for appropriate 
social functioning (Timler, 2003), and therefore much of the research in social 
functioning and social cognition has been conducted in children with Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders. Social cognition may be a developmental process that predicts ratings on the 
socialization questions (i.e., the “road map” to social interactions [Timler, 2003]), and it 
is social cognition that is delayed in children with AS and AD (Baron-Cohen, 1991). 
Development of Social Cognition  
Brune and Brune-Cohrs (2006), described a developmental model of social 
cognition in the following way, “Just as an infant is not capable of jumping before sitting, 
standing, and walking, the ability of appreciating one’s own and other’s mental states 
follows a distinct sequence...(p. 4) (summarized in Figure 1). ” Infants gradually develop 
the ability to understand intent, display joint attention, and gaze in the direction in which 
another is looking before the age of 18 months. Around 5-8 months of age, infants are 
observed to look longer when an object changes direction from a path implying intention 
(i.e. moving towards a hole in a box seemingly to remove itself from the box) rather than 
just changing physical direction (i.e. moving randomly around the screen) demonstrating 
an understanding of intent. In other words, it is inferred that infants at this age can predict 
the future action of an object (see Saxe et al., 2004 for review). At the age of 6 months, 
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healthy infants begin to differentiate between animate and inanimate objects, and later in 
the first year they begin to display joint attention, or the ability to look in the direction 
another person is looking (Bates et al., 1975; Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006). Directional 
gaze (i.e. looking in the direction in which another is looking) requires an understanding 
of intent and may be a developmental achievement required for social cognition (Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005). Following directional gaze is the ability to track a person’s 
pointing, which develops around 14 to 18 months (see Saxe et al., 2004 for review).  
Studies have shown that 42% of typically developing infants under 18 months of 
age and 63% of infants ages 18-20 months of age showed self-recognition (Amsterdam, 
1972).  Self-awareness, the ability to recognize one’s own mental states, is an ability that 
must exist before the ability to mentally attribute (Gallup 1982, 1998). Therefore, once 
one is aware of him or herself and then understands that he or she possesses cognitions 
and emotional states, one can entertain the possibility that others have similar states. Self 
awareness has traditionally been measured by analyzing the capacity to identify oneself 
in a mirror (Gallup, 1982, 1998, 2003; Platek et al., 2004; Platek & Levin, 2004). Typical 
tasks involve measuring self-referential or mirror directed behavior. Self-awareness, 
therefore, can be seen as a stepping stone toward complex social cognition.  
Children develop some of the first signs of mental state attribution, a higher level 
social cognitive ability, following the development of self-recognition, around the age of 
24 months (Brune & Brune-Cohrs, 2006) along with the development of pretend play 
(Leslie, 1987). Researchers have studied pretend play by measuring a child’s ability to 
participate in feeding himself and a doll, placing a telephone receiver up to his and a 
doll’s ear, and taking a drink and giving one to the doll (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004). 
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Children are also able to recognize the preferences of an investigator (i.e. hand the 
investigator his or her preferred food instead of the child’s preferred food) by the age of 2 
years (Repacholi & Gopnik 1997). 
 At about 4-6 years of age, children typically master the ability to recognize their 
own and other’s mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1991; Brune & 
Brune-Cohrs, 2006; Sodian et al., 2003; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Children begin to 
recognize that other people hold beliefs about another’s belief (Baron-Cohen, 1989), and 
recognize the emotions and thoughts of others, which has been shown to develop around 
the age of 5-6 years (see Brune & Brune-Cohrs 2006 for a review). Children can begin to 
use this skill to deceive or misrepresent themselves around the same time (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). At approximately 7 years of age, children are beginning to understand how 
to modify their speech so as not to offend others, as measured by a faux pas task (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999). 
 Mental state attribution was first described as belief attribution by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983). Baron-Cohen (1989) further delineated the development of belief 
attribution by describing a first and second order. The first order belief attribution can be 
thought of as the ability to acknowledge that another has a belief (Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). Leslie (1987) refers to first order belief as “meta-representation” (i.e. the ability to 
understand that one has mental states), or, knowing that someone else thinks. Researchers 
have used tasks such as short stories depicting beliefs by characters that are incorrect 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983) or the Sally and Anne false belief task to measure first order 
belief attribution (Wimmer and Perner, 1985).  
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Second order attribution was defined as the understanding that a person has a 
belief about another’s beliefs. For example, Sue thinks Bob thinks that he will meet with 
Judy in the library after class. Second order cognition requires taking into account that 
the ability to understand that others have mental states similar to your own enabling the 
prediction of actions based on that understanding. Tasks such as the “Ice-Cream Van” 
story (Perner & Wimmer, 1985) , which will be reviewed in a later section,  have been 
used to measure second order belief attribution. It may be possible, therefore, that 
possessing advanced belief attribution enables one to predict others’ behavior based on 
knowledge of their beliefs (Baron-Cohen 1985; Bowler, 1992) or to use deception to 
manipulate beliefs (Gallup, 1997; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). For instance, perhaps Judy 
asks Sue to tell her boyfriend Bob that she will not be able to meet him at the library. 
Sue, who has mastered the skill of belief attribution, can recognize that Bob thinks that 
Judy will meet him in the library unless Sue tells him otherwise. Sue knows, however, 
that Judy will not be there. Therefore, Sue decides to go to meet Bob. Sue was not only 
able to predict Bob’s action, but she was able to manipulate events to meet her goal of 
meeting Bob alone.  
The literature on social cognition suggests that second order belief attribution (i.e. 
understanding that someone has beliefs about another’s beliefs) may be correlated with 
social functioning. For example, Leppanen and Hietanen (2001) found that healthy 
school-age children (7-10 years of age) were least accurate at recognizing surprise and 
fear, two emotions that require an advanced understanding of another person’s beliefs. 
These researchers also found that the understanding of surprise was significantly related 
to social competence and peer popularity in females. Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2005) 
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conducted a longitudinal study of social communication in children with social deficits as 
they related to second order belief attribution skills. After controlling for intelligence 
scores and language, the researchers found that second order belief attribution contributed 
significantly to scores on contingent discourse (i.e. maintaining the topic of 
conversation). The same results were found approximately one year later, even with a 
significant increase in contingent discourse. Performance on social cognition tasks, 
therefore, correlated with the number of “on topic” utterances in conversations.  
The literature has clearly established a developmental process of social cognitive 
development beginning with the recognition of animate vs. inanimate objects, joint 
attention, directional gazing, self recognition, and pretend play during the first 2 years of 
life. Following these abilities, first order belief attribution (i.e. the understanding of false 
beliefs) and second order belief attribution (i.e. the ability to have beliefs about other’s 
beliefs) develops. There have been many tasks developed to measure complex levels of 
social cognition; however, research has just begun to demonstrate a link between social 
cognitive abilities and social functioning. Most researchers use tasks such as the false 
belief tasks (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Perner et al., 1989; Wimmer 
& Perner, 1983), social stories (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Bowler, 1992; Sabbagh, 2004), the 
faux pas task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), and most recently, the Mind in the Eyes Test-
Revised (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) to measure social cognition. 
Tasks measuring Social Cognition 
       “Sally and Anne” False Belief Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1985). One of the original 
false belief tasks was developed by Wimmer and Perner (1985). The “Sally and Anne” 
task employed two dolls named Sally and Anne, and children were asked to determine 
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where each doll would look for a hidden marble. The subject was first asked to name the 
dolls. Then, the doll named Sally placed a marble in a container and left the room. 
Following this, Anne changed the location of the marble while Sally was gone. When 
Sally returned, the subject was then asked, “Where will Sally look for her marble?” 
Performance on the task was measured as pass/fail. Also included were some control 
questions to confirm that the child was able to recall information such as, “Where was the 
marble in the beginning?” There has been no thorough investigation of the psychometric 
properties of this task, and studies have suggested the need for future research in the area 
(Mayes et al., 2006). 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985) conducted a study using this task including 
children with High Functioning Autism (HFA) (ages 6-16), Down Syndrome (ages 6-17), 
and typically developing children (ages 3-5). The results showed that 20% of children 
with AD passed the “Sally and Anne” task compared to 85% of children with Down’s 
syndrome and 86% of typically developing children. The children with HFA tended to 
pick the location in which the marble was actually located instead of the place that Sally 
thought it was. More recently, Colle, Baron-Cohen, and Hill (2007) used a non-verbal 
false belief test in an effort to separate children with speech and language impairments 
from children with AD. This research was conducted to address concerns regarding the 
intense load on language skills required for the traditional false belief test. The 
researchers documented impairment in theory of mind in children with AD independent 
of language abilities. The decrease in performance on the “Sally and Anne” task in 
children with HFA is consistent with previous literature which suggests a delay in theory 
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of mind abilities. While the “Sally and Anne” task measures first order belief attribution, 
the “Ice-cream Van” story was developed to analyze second order belief attribution. 
“Ice-Cream Van” story (Perner & Wimmer, 1985). The “Ice-Cream Van” story 
used by Perner and Wimmer (1985), Baron-Cohen (1989) and Bowler (1992) is an 
example of a social story designed to assess theory of mind. It is a story about John and 
Mary who have a miscommunication about the location of an ice cream truck. At the end 
of the story, Mary thinks John has gone to buy ice cream from a truck that was originally 
in one place but has now moved to another. The implication is that Mary will now look 
for John at the original location of the truck. This task has a number of “prompt 
questions” intended to control for attention and understanding of the story. The results 
from Baron-Cohen’s study (1989), which utilized participants with AD (ages 10-18), 
Down Syndrome (ages 9-17), and typically developing controls (age 7), suggest that 
children with AD may have a simple or first order theory of mind, as measured by the 
ability to pass a first order belief attribution task, but have difficulty with more advanced 
tasks. This was supported by the fact that 9 out of 10 participants with AD were unable to 
correctly point to the location Mary would think the truck would be located. Studies with 
similar stories have found that typically developing children demonstrate this ability 
around the age of 6 years (Wimmer & Perner 1983).  
While the “Ice Cream Van” story was developed to measure second order belief 
attribution, researchers became interested in expanding the investigation of social 
cognitive abilities in order to further understand the complexities of abilities necessary 
for social interactions. Happe’s strange stories (Happe, 1994) were developed to measure 
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the more advanced ability of mental state attribution or understanding what another 
person is thinking or feeling.  
Happe’s “strange stories” (Happe, 1994). Happe’s strange stories (1994) were 
designed to assess children’s understanding of characters’ thoughts and feelings. The task 
consists of 24 short stories that require mental state attribution for comprehension. There 
are two examples of different situations in which mental state attribution is needed. The 
first situations include jokes, misunderstandings, and lies, while the second investigates 
figures of speech. The task, when used by Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen (1999) who found 
that those with AD and AS made significantly more incorrect mental state justifications 
than typically developing controls. A recent replication of Happe’s “strange stories” also 
showed that children with AS of normal intelligence (i.e. IQ of >85) showed deficits in 
appropriately using mental state terms (Kaland et al., 2005). 
“Mind in the Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). A recent test designed to 
measure mental state attribution in adults, the “Mind in the Eyes Test,” was originally 
developed by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1997). The test consists of displays of 
emotion as depicted by window slot pictures of people’s eyes (see Figure 2). It is 
comprised of 25, two-word, forced-choice items that are emotional opposites (e.g. 
concerned and unconcerned, or noticing someone else and noticing you). The emotions 
depicted are not simple emotions such as happy or sad, and instead focus on more 
“complex” mental states that may require a sophisticated theory of mind. 
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1997) researched the ability of this test to 
differentiate theory of mind performance by including adult participants with HFA, 
Tourette’s Sydrome, and typically developing controls. They found that the group of 
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participants with Tourette’s Syndrome and the typical control subjects performed 
significantly better than participants with HFA. The researchers also found a sex 
difference suggesting that females performed significantly better than males on this test. 
There is only one documented attempt made to measure the construct validity of this task. 
Investigators noted similarly poorer performance of children with HFA compared to 
children with Tourette’s Syndrome when given both the Mind in the Eyes Test and 
Happe’s “strange stories.” Happe’s “strange stories” were given to participants as part of 
a separate study, however, and the tasks were not directly compared (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1997). 
In recent modifications to the “Eyes” test, Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) 
revised the test to include 36 items and a 4-word forced choice format instead of 2-word 
(see Figure 2). The word choices were modified to increase the difficulty of the test and 
to avoid ceiling effects. Instead of choices like “interested” and “disinterested” (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1997), the choices provided descriptions such as, “playful, comforting, 
arrogant, and hateful.” The researchers suggested that the addition of choices introduces 
ambiguity to the test requiring the use of an advanced ability to mentally attribute. A 
children’s version of the test was also developed by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001).  
Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001b) found that children with no diagnosis scored 
significantly higher on the Mind in the Eyes test at ages 8-10 years of age ( = 18.1, SD 
= 4.7, n = 8) and ages 10-12 years ( = 20.2, SD = 2.4, n = 9) than children with AS 
ages 8-14 years ( = 12.6, SD = 3.3, n = 15). This suggested an effect for age as well as 
diagnosis on performance on this task. It is also important to note that the researchers 
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controlled for attention to the eyes by asking participants to indicate the gender of the 
person in the pictures.  
Faux Pas Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) - More recently, Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (1999) developed an advanced social cognition task focused on the detection 
of a faux pas. Aimed at the 9 to11 year old age range, the test is comprised of 10 stories 
in which a character commits a faux pas. The authors define faux pas as, “…when a 
speaker says something without considering if it is something that the listener might not 
have wanted to hear or know, and which typically has negative consequences that the 
speaker never intended” (p. 408). Committing a faux pas tends to result in feelings of 
regret or embarrassment and is hypothesized to require (1) an understanding that there is 
a difference in the knowledge of the characters and (2) an appreciation of the emotion of 
the situation (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). The following is an example of a faux pas story: 
Steve, a scientist, is traveling on a plane with his wife. Suddenly, he is tapped on
 the shoulder by another scientist. Steve looks up, sees that he knows this man, and
 says, “Oh hi! How nice to run into you! Let me introduce you to my wife, Betsy.
 Betsy, this is Jeffrey, a good friend of mine from Harvard days.” Betsy says, “Oh,
 hi Jeffrey, pleased to meet you.” The other man replies, “Er, my name isn’t
 Jeffrey, it’s Mike,” (p. 408). 
Male children ages 9 and older have been shown to perform above chance on this task 
with 80% accuracy by age 11 years (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999).  
Social Cognition of Children on the Autistic Spectrum 
AD and AS are pervasive developmental disorders characterized by severe 
impairments in social functioning including conversation skills and reciprocal social 
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interactions (APA, 1994). Children with AS or AD have been shown to be delayed in the 
acquisition of social cognitive abilities (Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1991; Charman et al., 1997; 
Happe, 2003). Baron-Cohen and colleagues (1985), using the Mind in the Eyes task, 
showed that children with HFA have a deficit in the ability to mentally attribute. Levin 
Allen (2008) similarly found that 8 year old children with AS demonstrated poorer 
recognition of emotions and cognitions of others when compared to typically developing 
siblings of children on the Autistic Spectrum.  Leekam and Perner (1991) have 
documented that 4 year-old children with AD also performed significantly worse than 
typically developing 4-year-old children at a false photograph task (i.e. a task where the 
photograph presented does not properly represent an actual real-world environment).  
In emotion recognition research, persons with AD have the most difficulty 
recognizing surprise, which requires knowledge of the beliefs of others that differ from 
your own, as opposed to angry, happy, sad, neutral, or “just ok” (Loveland et al., 1997). 
This is consistent with Baron-Cohen’s supposition (1985, 1991) that people with AD 
should have difficulty with second order belief attribution, as surprise requires a more 
advanced understanding of another’s emotions. Heerey et al. (2003) found that self-
conscious emotions, such as embarrassment, were linked to theory of mind ability 
independent of intelligence in 8-15 year old children with HFA. These children often 
identified embarrassed as “happy,” implying a lack of understanding of the emotion. 
Social Cognition and Social Functioning in children with AS.  The current 
literature suggests that deficits in social cognition (Baron-Cohen & Frith 1985, Baron-
Cohen 1991) and social functioning (APA, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1985; Hale & 
Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Happe, 2003; Klin, Volkmar, & Sparrow 1992) may exist 
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independent of one another for children with AS. In particular, the deficits have been 
shown in children with AS in the areas of social interactions (Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 
2005) and understanding of others’ emotions (Heerey et al., 2003). Research on 
interventions for children with AS have demonstrated improvements in recognizing the 
emotions of others (Solomen et al., 2004), companionship abilities and sharing 
(Bauminger, 2007), as well as overall social functioning (Lopata et al., 2008) in social 
skills groups that include teaching children how to understand and recognize the 
emotions of others. 
A recent study (Levin Allen, thesis) found that the ability to recognize another’s 
emotions and cognitions was significantly related to play and leisure skills for 8 year old 
children with AS as well as siblings of children with autistic spectrum diagnoses. 
Children with AS also performed significantly lower than unaffected siblings. This 
association was not found for children ages 9-13 years in either group, suggesting that the 
social development of children with AS, between the ages of 8 and 9 years of age, may 
be negatively affected by late mastery of the capacity for reading complex emotional and 
cognitive mental states of others.  
Six to eight year old children begin to develop a desire to be liked and accepted 
by others while 9-11 year old children are emotionally invested in forming stronger more 
complex peer relationships (CDCP, 2005; CDCP, 2005b). By the age of 9, it is possible 
that children begin to recognize that a child with AS does not participate in peer 
interactions in similar ways as others. While other children are beginning to use higher 
order social cognition to manipulate others and/or predict other’s actions, children with 
AS may have just mastered first or second order belief attribution. This research suggests 
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that there may be an important relationship between the development of social cognition 
(i.e. the age at which this knowledge emerges) and performance or application of the 
abilities in a social environment (i.e. social functioning) that should be further explored.  
Summary and Rationale  
For this study, social competence/functioning is conceptualized as reflecting three 
separate domains: social abilities, social skills, and social performance. Social abilities 
are the underlying knowledge necessary for social interactions often labeled social 
cognition. Social skills can be thought of as the way in which one uses his or her social 
knowledge. Social performance is a measure of a child’s social functioning in a social 
environment. In other words, whether a child is good at using his abilities and skills in a 
social arena (LeGoff, personal communication). The majority of the work in the area of 
social cognition in children with AS has focused on analyzing the deficits in abilities 
purportedly needed to perform socially. The current approach, although useful and 
informative, has only just started to connect “social functioning” to “social cognition.”  
The delay in the development of social abilities or cognition may be related to 
abnormal social behavior or performance in participants with AD independent of general 
cognitive ability (Baron-Cohen, 1985, 1991) and language comprehension (Perner et al., 
1989). Although the literature on social cognition in children with AS has demonstrated 
that a deficit exists beyond that which can be explained by neuropsychological deficits, 
there is still some controversy in the field (Saxe et al., 2004). Research has shown deficits 
in executive functioning in children with ADHD and AS (Geurts et al., 2004; see 
Sergeant et al., 2002 for review) that must be accounted for when interpreting 
performance on social cognitive tasks to ensure that deficits in executive functioning do 
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not account for the variability in performance on social cognitive tasks. Previous studies 
have cited the lack of testing for executive functioning (i.e. problem solving skills or 
inhibition) and cognitive abilities (i.e. IQ testing) as limitations (Levin Allen 2008; see 
Saxe et al., 2004 for review) in interpreting finding in social cognition research. It is 
important, therefore, to include measures of executive functioning skills to ensure an 
appropriate level of cognitive ability when using social cognitive tasks. 
Social Cognition of Children with ADHD. Social cognitive abilities have been 
shown to be deficient in some children who have social deficits (i.e. children with AD or 
AS), while social cognitive abilities in others with social difficulties, such as children 
with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) have not been as well researched 
(Nijmeijer et al., 2008). It has been suggested that it is important to include a control 
group of children with psychological conditions that impact social functioning when 
investigating social cognition in children with AS (Buitelaar et al., 1999).  
One study of children with various psychiatric conditions found evidence to 
suggest that children with psychiatric conditions, ADHD in particular, perform more 
poorly than typically developing children on tasks of second order belief attribution 
(Buitelaar et al., 1999). It should be noted, however, that these results were based on only 
nine children, mostly male, with ADHD who were compared with a control group that 
was predominately female.  
A more recent study by Downs and Smith (2004) of children ages 5 to 9 years 
(mean around age 8 years) found that children with AD performed significantly worse at 
identifying emotional facial expressions in photographs than children with ADHD and 
Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) or nonclinical children. There were no significant 
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differences between groups (i.e. children with AD, ADHD/ODD, and nonclinical 
controls) on children’s performance when asked to identify emotional facial expressions 
in schematic drawings, identifying situation-based emotions (e.g. how will Johnny feel 
when x happens), identifying desire-based emotions (e.g. what does Johnny want and 
how will he feel when x happens…), and identifying belief-based emotions (e.g. this is 
what Johnny wants and this is what Johnny thinks, Johnny doesn’t know x, what will 
Johnny feel when x happens). Although children seemed to perform more poorly overall, 
there was no difference between groups, when asked to identify belief-based emotions, a 
complex task measuring the knowledge that someone has a thought that differs from 
another as well as the emotions that person has based on his belief. Children with 
ADHD/ODD answered significantly fewer questions correct on the emotional 
understanding tasks overall than nonclinical children, while children with AS showed a 
trend toward the same finding. In general, the differences between children with 
ADHD/ODD and AS on emotional understanding were not fully delineated.  
There have been very few studies conducted on the social cognition of children 
with ADHD. Research regarding the social cognition of children with ADHD should be 
further explored to determine whether children with ADHD have deficits in this area or if 
social functioning problems are due to other difficulties such as skill deficits as is 
currently hypothesized.  
Social Functioning in Children with ADHD.  Children with ADHD display 
frequent and severe patterns of inattention and/or hyperactivity-impulsivity before the age 
of 7 and across two or more settings (e.g. school and home) (DSM, 1994). Children who 
have problems with inattention and impulsivity may also have difficulties in social 
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functioning including problems with maintaining conversations (e.g. not listening to 
others, frequently shifting the conversation, not following the details of the conversation, 
interrupting others) and peer rejection (DSM, 1994). Generally, children with ADHD 
have social difficulties that arise from problems in regulating behavior resulting in 
seemingly aggressive, restless, or intrusive behavior and maintaining attention in 
conversations or situations (e.g. difficulty switching roles and other conversational 
difficulties as described above) resulting in peer rejection (see Nijmeijer et al., 2008 for 
review). Researchers have theorized that impaired social functioning in children with 
ADHD is most likely due to performance deficits and not skill deficits (see Landau & 
Moore 1991 for review). In other words, children with ADHD may know how to behave, 
but often perform inappropriately in social situations. Children with ADHD should, 
therefore, demonstrate social functioning problems but should not have deficits in social 
cognition, and will represent an appropriate comparison group.  
Purpose 
The purpose of this research study is to determine whether performance on a 
social cognition task is associated with social functioning or parent reported performance 
in a social environment and whether this association differs between groups.  
Research has shown that children with AS display deficits in social cognition 
(Baron-Cohen & Frith 1985, Baron-Cohen 1991) and social functioning (APA, 1994; 
Baron-Cohen, 1989, 1985; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2005; Happe, 2003; Klin, Volkmar, 
& Sparrow 1992) independently. Children with ADHD show deficits in social 
functioning (DSM, 1994; Nijmeijer et al., 2008), however the findings on social 
cognition (i.e. social abilities) in children with ADHD are less clear (Buitelaar et al., 
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1999; Downs & Smith, 2004). It has been suggested that social deficits (i.e. deficits in 
performance) in children with ADHD result from an overall lack of skill (see Landau & 
Moore 1991 for review), while children with AS have social deficits that may result from 
a lack of or difficulty with social cognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Studies have also 
just begun to identify a potential link between social cognition and social functioning in 
children (Levin Allen, 2008). The current study was designed to add to the research on 
social cognition in children with social deficits, as well as attempt to expand previous 
work to confirm findings of an association between social cognition and social 
functioning with a larger sample size and better comparison groups.   
Research in the area of social cognition and social functioning has important 
implications for clinicians working with children deficient in social development, as there 
are inherent differences in selected interventions and therapeutic effectiveness depending 
on which abilities are the antecedent to the presenting problems. Finding associations 
between deficits in abilities and social performance has the potential to maximize the 
effectiveness of social skills programs. For instance, if a child’s behavior problems stem 
from problems with social cognition, as suggested in children with AS, one would focus 
on therapies that improve the child’s abilities in that area. If a child has intact social 
cognition, but continues to display poor performance in a social environment, as is 
suggested for children with ADHD, it is possible that the child lacks social skills and 
must be taught ways in which to appropriately use their abilities.  
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Hypotheses 
Aim 1: To investigate social cognitive abilities of 7-12 year old children with and 
without diagnoses that are associated with social functioning deficits, controlling for 
executive functioning. 
 Hypothesis 1a: Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would differ by group 
such that children with AS would perform poorer than children with ADHD or typically 
developing controls.   
Hypothesis 1b: Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would differ by age 
such that performance would improve with age.   
Aim 2: To investigate the relationship between development of social cognitive ability 
and social functioning in children with and without diagnoses associated with social 
deficits.  
Hypothesis 2a:  Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would be associated 
with social functioning as measured by the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale-II 
Socialization Domain, controlling for group.  
Hypothesis 2b:  Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would be associated 
with social functioning as measured by the Social Skills Rating Scale parent form, 
controlling for group. 
Exploratory Aim: The relationship between performance on the social cognition task 
and social functioning was explored.  An attempt was made to break down children into 
two groups, those who have mastered the social cognition task and those who fall below 
the cut-off for mastery. 
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Hypothesis Ea: Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would be associated 
with social functioning as measured by the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale-II 
Socialization Domain in the group who has not mastered the social cognition task only.  
Hypothesis Eb: Performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would be associated 
with social functioning as measured by the Social Skills Rating Scale parent form in the 
group who has not mastered the social cognition task only. 
 2.  Method 
Participant Recruitment 
Children with AS. Children with AS were recruited from the Center for 
Neurological and Neurodevelopmental Health (CNNH) in Voorhees, NJ. Male children, 
ages 7 through 12 years, diagnosed with AS, using the criteria for AS as defined by the 
DSM-IV-TR, were included through open enrollment. An Autism Diagnostic 
Observation Schedule (ADOS) and clinical interview was used for each participant to 
confirm the diagnosis of AS. Diagnoses were made by professionals who specialized in 
the area of children with AS.  
Children with ADHD. Participants diagnosed with ADHD were also recruited 
from the Center for Neurological and Neurodevelopmental Health (CNNH) in Voorhees, 
NJ. Male children, ages 7 through 12 already diagnosed with ADHD as defined by the 
DSM-IV-TR were included through open enrollment. Diagnosis was not made as part of 
this investigation but was confirmed as part of the recruitment process by reviewing the 
DSM-IV TR criteria for each participant to ensure they met criteria for the diagnosis of 
ADHD.  
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Typically Developing Children. Typically developing students were recruited in 
two ways. First, in order to ensure similar socioeconomic status, children were recruited 
by asking participants in the AS or ADHD group to provide the investigator’s contact 
information to a friend with no known psychological or psychiatric diagnosis who may 
be willing to participate in the study. Children were also recruited from advertisements, 
which were placed in the CNNH waiting room and sent out in local newsletters.  
The exclusion criteria were as follows. For the AS and ADHD group, (1) 
participants with a concurrent neurological or psychiatric diagnosis other than ADHD, (2) 
patients taking psychotropic medication other than medications for ADHD (3) patients 
with other health issues limiting participation (for example, psychosocial stressors or 
medical limitations), (4) patients with significant visual impairment or hearing problems, 
either of which could impact their ability to complete the tests, (5) those who could not 
respond appropriately to the test due to potential difficulties with understanding the tasks 
or those with an IQ below 80, and (7) females were excluded to reduce variability in the 
sample.  
For the typically developing control group, the exclusion criteria included all of 
the above with the following modification to items (1) and (2): (1) participants with 
concurrent neurological or psychological diagnosis including ADHD or AS were 
excluded, (2) patients taking psychotropic medications including medications for ADHD 
were excluded.  
Children in the AS or ADHD group were identified by a psychologist based on 
clinical interactions with them. An eligibility form developed for this study was then used 
(Appendix 1) to indicate a diagnosis of AS or ADHD and to determine whether a child 
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met the inclusion/exclusion criteria based on information typically obtained in an initial 
interview or assessment. Following the completion of the eligibility form and 
determination of eligibility, names were given to the investigator who then called the 
family to ensure interest. For all participants, eligibility criteria was provided to the 
parent over the phone, but was not directly assessed until after the family met with the 
investigator and signed the consent/assent forms. If the family was interested in the study, 
the researcher scheduled a time to sign the consent/assent forms, review the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, have the parent complete the questionnaires, and have the participant 
complete the study at the CNNH.  
All children who agreed to participate by signing the consent form, whether they 
are able to complete the tasks or not, were entered into a drawing to receive a gift. The 
gift was a $40 gift card.  
Measures 
Mind in the Eyes Task (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). The child version of the Mind 
in the Eyes test is composed of 28 pictures of male and female eyes which convey an 
emotion. The words were presented in a random order to the participant and contained 
three incorrect or “foil” affect labels and one correct emotional description. Correct and 
foil terms were piloted by Baron-Cohen and were deemed to be correct if more than half 
of typically developing children chose the label, and if the second most common label 
was not chosen by more than a third of the same group of children (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001b). In order to score above chance level, a participant needed to correctly identify the 
feeling for 9 of the 28 items. The Mind in the Eyes score is cumulative based on total 
number correct. 
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The Mind in the Eyes test was described to the child by explaining that he would 
see pictures and would be asked to respond to those pictures by choosing the best answer 
from four different words. Words were be both written on the page and read to the 
participant. The investigator pointed to each word on the sheet as the word was read 
aloud and participants were asked to point to their response. The exact instructions were 
as follows: “Each picture has four words around it. I want you to look carefully at the 
picture and then choose the word that best describes what the person in the picture is 
thinking or feeling. Let’s try a practice. Do you think this person is feeling jealous, 
scared, relaxed, or hate (the researcher pointed to each word as she stated them)? Pick the 
word that describes what this person is thinking or feeling.” After the practice item, the 
instructions continue: “You might find some of them quite easy and some of them quite 
hard, so don’t worry if it’s not always easy to choose the best word. Please ask me if 
you’re not sure what a word means. I will read the words for you and I will point to the 
words, so you can read along if you’d like. If you really can’t choose the best word, you 
can have a guess (p. 2)” (Baron-Cohen, 2001c). 
Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale-II  (Sparrow et al., 2005). The Vineland 
Adaptive Behavior Scale, Second Edition, is the most frequently used measure of 
adaptive functioning (Luiselli et al., 2001). The survey form of the Vineland Adaptive 
Behavior Scale-II Socialization Scale was administered to the parents of the participants 
for all groups. Sparrow and Cicchetti (1978), two of the developers of the Vineland scale, 
found high correlations between primary caregiver and independent assessment of levels 
of adaptive behavior, suggesting that parents were able to reliably complete the survey.  
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The Vineland-II contains 433 items divided into five domains: Communication, 
Daily Living Skills, Socialization, Motor Skills, and Maladaptive Behavior. The current 
study is focused on the Socialization domain (99 questions), which contained three sub-
domains -- Interpersonal Relations (38 questions), Play and Leisure Time (31 questions) 
and Coping Skills (30 questions). The Interpersonal Relationships sub-domain includes 
information about responding to others, expressing and recognizing emotions, imitation, 
friendship, thoughtfulness, belonging to groups, and dating. Play and Leisure Time 
involves playing, sharing and cooperating, television and radio, hobbies, and going places 
with friends. Finally, the Coping Skills sub-domain includes questions regarding 
manners, following rules, apologizing, keeping secrets, controlling impulses, and 
responsibility.  
Parents were instructed that the items on the Socialization Domain should be rated 
on the following scale: “yes, usually (2),” “sometimes or partially (1),” or “no, never 
(0),” “don’t know (DK),” and “no opportunity (N).” If the parents are unsure of the 
response, he or she was asked to choose the best answer. Parents were instructed that any 
skill that their child had mastered during typical development (e.g. turns head toward 
caregiver) should be rated as a “2.” Any skill that a child had not reached or was not old 
enough to have reached (e.g. attends a full time job) were rated as a “0.” The Vineland-II 
Socialization Domain was derived based on age in order to obtain a standard score (Mean 
= 100, SD = 15), and the Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationships, Vineland-II Coping, 
Vineland-II Play and Leisure Time were also derived based on age in order to obtain a 
standard V-score (Mean = 15, SD = 3) with higher scores indicating better functioning. 
The Vineland-II has demonstrated strong reliability and validity and has shown moderate 
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correlations with other adaptive behavior inventories more than with intelligence tests 
which support the construct validity of this scale (Sparrow et al., 2005).  
Social Skills Rating System (Gresham & Elliot 1990). The Social Skills Rating 
System (SSRS) was developed in 1990 to obtain parent, teacher, and child reports of 
social behavior.  The current study focused on the total scale score of the parent scale 
which contains four subscales  (i.e. Cooperation, Assertion, and Self control, 
Responsibility). The SSRS parent version (SSRS-P) was administered to the parents of 
the participants for all three groups.  Parents were instructed to think about their child’s 
present behavior and decide how often the child performs a behavior and how important 
each behavior is to the child’s development using the scale described above. If the 
parents were unsure of the response, they were asked to choose the best answer.  
The SSRS-P contains 38 items divided into 4 subscales – Cooperation, Assertion, 
Self Control, and Responsibility. Each subscale consists of 10 items, with 2 questions 
loading on two factors, that are rated as occurring “never (0),” “sometimes (1),” or “very 
often (2)” and as “not important (0),” “important (1),” or “critical.” A total scale standard 
score (  = 100, SD = 15) was obtained. Higher scores indicate better social skills. The 
SSRS has demonstrated strong reliability and has shown high to moderate correlations 
with other behavior inventories including the Behavior Assessment System for Children 
and the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scale (Van der Oord et al., 2005).  
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) – (Wechsler 1999) is a 
brief and reliable measure of intellectual ability that provides a full-scale IQ score using 
two subtests, which can be given in about 15 minutes. The WASI contains a 4 subtest and 
2 subtest version. This study used in the 2 subtest version, which has been deemed 
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sufficient when considering time limitations and is useful when using the test as a 
screening tool for general cognitive functioning. Subtests included the Vocabulary 
subtest, a measure of verbal knowledge in which children are asked to define words, and 
the Matrix Reasoning subtest, a measure of nonverbal reasoning in which children are 
asked to choose the appropriate abstract design from a group of designs. Each subtest 
results in a T-score    (  = 50, SD = 10) and an overall Full Scale IQ standard score (  = 
100, SD = 15). Higher scores indicate better functioning. The WASI demonstrated high 
reliability and stability. When compared to other cognitive ability measures such as the 
WISC-III, the WASI demonstrated good construct validity. It is important to exclude 
children whose cognitive ability are in the mentally retarded range, which could impact 
their ability to understand the task presented. For children who were being seen 
clinically, and were given a WISC-IV as part of their assessment, that IQ was used in 
place of the WASI to screen for cognitive ability.  
Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) (Gioia et al., 2000) – 
The BRIEF is a questionnaire of executive functioning that has a parent, self, and teacher 
version. The current study administered the Parent Form and was interested in the 
Behavioral Regulation and Meta-cognition indexes. The Behavioral Regulation Index 
includes Inhibiting, Shifting, and Emotional control, and the meta-cognition index 
includes Initiation, Working Memory, Planning/organizing, Organization of Materials, 
and Monitoring. The Parent Form has 86 items with ratings of “never (0), sometimes (1), 
or often (2).” Norms are available for children ages 5-18 years of age. Children with AS 
have been shown to have greater difficulty with shifting and flexibility than children with 
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ADHD (see Baron 2004 for review). The BRIEF has demonstrated moderate to high 
reliability. Convergent and discriminate validity are well established (Gioia et al., 2000).  
Procedure 
Institutional Review Board approval was obtained from Drexel University for this 
study. Upon arrival to the CNNH office, the investigator described the tasks to potential 
participants and consent was obtained from the parent and assent was obtained from the 
child. Demographic data was collected about the child participants from parents including 
the following items: age, birth date, race, educational setting, therapies and services, 
number of siblings, and parent or guardian completing the questionnaires.   
Parents were given a packet of questionnaires and asked to complete them in 
order (i.e. the demographic sheet, BRIEF, Vineland-II Socialization Domain, SSRS). At 
the same time, each child was escorted to a testing room at the CNNH. Participants in the 
AS or ADHD group as well as the typically developing children completed the following 
tasks in order: the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests from the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (if an IQ was not previously obtained 
clinically) and the Mind in the Eyes task.  
Data Analysis 
 Once the data were collected, scored, entered, and checked, a preliminary analysis 
was conducted to assess the distribution of variables and determine the need for 
covariates. Demographic variables (i.e. grade and educational setting) were tested as 
potential correlates on dependent measures (i.e. Vineland-II Socialization and the SSRS 
total scores) using a Chi Square analysis. see Table 1. The majority of the sample was 
Caucasian with only one African American child in each of the Asperger’s and ADHD 
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group. Therefore, race was dropped as a potential covariate. Only mothers completed the 
questionnaires. Next, to ensure that the relationship between the independent and 
dependent variables was not due to executive functioning deficits, Pearson Correlations 
were conducted for each group between the social skills scales and the BRIEF. Age was 
analyzed as part of the hypothesis testing. A t-test was conducted for all continuous 
demographic variables and a Chi Square was conducted for categorical variables to 
determine differences between the groups. Significant findings were entered into the 
analyses as covariates.  
A power analysis, conducted using Cohen’s (1992) Power Primer for the ANOVA 
with 3 groups and a medium effect size, indicated that a total of 52 participants per group 
would be necessary to obtain a power of .80. Previous research has shown an effect size 
for detecting differences on the Mind in the Eyes test between typically developing 
children and children with AS to be between .56 and .80 (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b). 
Therefore, for a multiple regression with 3 independent estimated variables, using an 
alpha level of .05, a medium effect size, and a power of .80, a total of 34-76 participants 
per group was necessary. This study expected to recruit approximately 30 participants per 
group. Since recruitment was less than expected, an attempt was made to analyze effect 
sizes and observed power was reviewed as a potential limitation.  
Twenty-nine participants consented to the study. One subject was not able to 
complete the study due to difficulty understanding the tasks on the WASI. Participants in 
the control group included two siblings of patients currently attending CNNH who saw 
the advertisement and contacted the investigator. The other two participants saw the 
advertisement outside of the CNNH and contacted the investigator.  
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Two subjects’ data were removed due to scores that presented as outliers from the 
rest of the AS group (i.e. scores of 20 or above on the Mind in the Eyes test). One subject 
was in a regular education setting and had not received any social skills intervention or 
services. The other child received behavior therapy in the past and was receiving social 
skills therapy services as well as counseling and psychology services for behavior. Both 
children had the extremely high scores (i.e. two of the highest among all subjects) on 
both the BRIEF Meta-cognition and Behavior Regulation subscales. Due to the small 
sample size, these two subjects were removed in order to better examine the population 
of children with AS who fell in a more typical range based on previous research. Previous 
studies have cited a mean of 12.6 (SD =3.3) for children with Asperger’s Disorder ages 8-
14 years. The mean for the AS group in this study was 14.25 (SD = 3.25) without the 
outliers compared to a mean of 15.14 (SD = 3.76) with the outliers. The remaining group 
sizes were 12 children with Asperger’s Disorder, 10 with ADHD, and 4 typically 
developing children. Due to the extremely small sample size of the typically developing 
group, the data was described only and was not used in statistical analysis. 
To test Aim 1, Hypothesis 1a, that performance on the social cognitive task would 
differ by group such that children with AS would perform more poorly than the other 
groups, a one-tailed t-test was conducted. To test Aim 1, Hypothesis 1b, that performance 
on the Mind in the Eyes task would improve with age, a bivariate correlation was 
conducted for the social cognitive measure and age. 
  To test Aim 2, Hypothesis 2a and 2b, that performance on the social cognitive 
task would predict with social functioning, a stepwise regression was conducted 
regressing each social functioning measure (i.e. the Vineland-II Socialization and SSRS 
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parent) on group and any identified covariates from prior analysis (step 1) as well as the 
Mind in the Eyes test (step 2).  
To test the Exploratory Aim, Hypothesis Ea, that the relationship between 
performance on the social cognition task and social functioning would depend on level of 
mastery, age of mastery was defined as the point at which visual analysis of the data 
indicated no difference between children with Asperger’s Disorder and the other two 
groups. Visual analysis did not reveal this finding, however a frequency analysis revealed 
a cut-off score of 16 (i.e. approximately 50% - 11 children - scoring less than 16 items 
correct on the Mind in the Eyes test and approximately 50% - 15 children scoring 16 
items or more on the test), which was used to separate the data into two groups (i.e. low 
and high performance). Partial correlations were then conducted, controlling for group, to 
determine whether there was an association between the Mind in the Eyes test and the 
social functioning measures.   
3. Results 
Group Comparison 
 Data on educational setting was collected as a descriptive measure of educational 
placement. Educational setting was analyzed using a Chi Square test and was found to 
indicate a significant difference between groups X2 (4, N=26) = 12.25, p = .02, Grade 
was also analyzed with a Chi Square revealing no significant differences between groups. 
All participants had an IQ with a standard score above 80. Two participants, one child 
with ADHD and one child with AS, had cognitive abilities in the Low Average range. 
See Table 1 and Figures 3 & 4 for demographic information. 
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 Independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine differences between the 
AS and ADHD groups for the socialization variables (see Table 2). There was a 
significant difference between groups on the Vineland-II Socialization Domain, but no 
difference was found between groups on the SSRS Social Skills Scale. Children with AS 
had a mean in the Borderline range on the Vineland-II Socialization Domain and in the 
Low Average range on the SSRS Social Skills Scale, while children with ADHD had 
scores in the Average range on both measures. However, no statistically significant 
difference was found. Children in the control group were not included in the analysis, but 
had mean scores on both social functioning measures in the Superior range.  
 On the Subscales of the Vineland-II Socialization, t-tests revealed significant 
differences between the AS and ADHD groups on the Interpersonal relationships and the 
Play and Leisure Time subscales. No significant differences were found for the Coping 
Skills subscale. Children with AS scored in the Moderately Low range overall for both 
the Interpersonal Relationships and the Play and Leisure subscales while children with 
ADHD performed in the Adequate range overall on both subscales. Typically developing 
children were not included in the analysis, but were in the Moderately High range for 
both the Interpersonal Relationships and the Coping Skills scales and in the Adequate 
range for the Play and Leisure Time subscale (see Table 2).  
Preliminary Analyses 
Measures 
 Pearson correlations were conducted to determine the relationship between the 
standardized scales of social functioning (see Table 3). The Vineland-II measures were 
significantly associated with the Social Skills Rating Scale total score.  
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Determination of Covariates 
 To determine the need for potential covariates in hypotheses testing, the groups 
were first compared on demographic variables (i.e. grade and placement). Significant a 
priori group differences were found between groups on educational placement. A 
multivariate ANOVA was then conducted to determine whether educational placement 
was significantly related to dependent measures, which was not significant. Therefore, 
educational placement was not included as a covariate. Next, bivariate correlations were 
conducted for age and BRIEF variables with all dependent variables (i.e. social 
functioning measures). Significant relationships were found between the Behavior 
Regulation subscale of the BRIEF and the Vineland-II Play and Leisure Time subscale as 
well as the BRIEF Meta-cognition subscale and the SSRS Social Skills scale. All other 
correlations were not significant. It should be noted that a relationship between age and 
the Vineland-II scales, SSRS, and the BRIEF subscales was not expected since they are 
standardized for age. This does suggest, however, that children with ADHD and AS 
demonstrated raw score improvements keeping their standard scores relatively consistent. 
The BRIEF Behavior Regulation and Meta-cognition subscales were used as covariates 
for the dependent variables to which they were significantly related only.  
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1a was that the Mind in the Eyes task would differ by group such that 
children with AS would perform poorer than children with ADHD or typically 
developing children. The Mind in the Eyes performance was compared between AS and 
ADHD groups only, using a one-tailed independent samples t-test. All participants scored 
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above chance level on the Mind in the Eyes test, and were therefore included in the 
analyses. The results were significance (t(20) = -1.92, p = .04), and demonstrated a large 
effect size. Means for the AS and ADHD group were 14.25 (SD = 3.25) and 17.10 (SD = 
3.73) items correct respectively. Typically developing children were not included in the 
analysis, but had a mean of 18.25 items correct on the Mind in the Eyes task. This 
hypothesis was supported (see Table 2).  
 Hypothesis 1b, that performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would differ by age 
such that performance would improve with age, was analyzed using a partial correlation 
controlling for group. Age was significantly related to Mind in the Eyes performance (r = 
.70, p < .01). Therefore, this hypothesis was supported (see Table 3 & Figure 5).  
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2a was that performance on the Mind in the Eyes task predict social 
functioning. This hypothesis was tested for the Vineland-II Socialization Domain score 
using a stepwise regression as described above, which resulted in a model that was 
significant. Only group was a significant predictor, however and the Mind in the Eyes test 
was excluded. Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported (see Table 4). 
 Hypothesis 2b, that performance on the Mind in the Eyes task would be 
associated with the Social Skills Rating Scale was analyzed using a stepwise regression 
controlling for BRIEF Meta-cognition, which was identified as a covariate in prior 
analyses. The overall model was significant, however only the BRIEF Meta-cognition 
subscale and group were indentified as significant predictors. The Mind in the Eyes 
variable was excluded.  Therefore, this hypothesis was not supported (See Table 4).  
Exploratory Analyses 
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Exploratory Hypotheses 
 The relationship between performance on the Mind in the Eyes task and social 
functioning was further explored. After finding that age was significantly related to Mind 
in the Eyes performance controlling for group, a graphical representation of the 
relationship between age and Mind in the Eyes performance was reviewed. The visual 
depiction did not indicate the anticipated findings. A frequency analysis was then used to 
separate the participants into a low (i.e. less than 16 items correct on the Mind in the 
Eyes) and high performance (i.e. greater than or equal to 16 items correct) group. Partial 
correlations were conducted for the low and high performance groups independently 
associating the Mind in the Eyes performance with all social functioning measures, 
controlling for group. No significant associations were found. For the AS and ADHD 
groups, Mind in the Eyes performance did increased with age.  
Variables of Interest 
 In order to further explore the relationship between Mind in the Eyes performance 
and the social functioning measures, a partial correlation was conducted controlling for 
group and age.  Interaction effects that could more specifically depict the relationship 
between age, group, Mind in the Eyes performance and social functioning measures (i.e. 
a multiple regression with main effects and interaction terms) could not be analyzed due 
to the small sample size. Results of the partial correlations were not significant for the 
Vineland Socialization Domain, the Vineland Play and Leisure Time subscale, the 
Vineland Coping Skills subscale, or the SSRS Social Skills scale. The relationship 
between Mind in the Eyes performance and the Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationships 
subscale approached significance (r = -.41, p = .07) but was inversely related. In other 
36  
words, as performance on the Mind in the Eyes task improved, Vineland-II Interpersonal 
Relations scores were lower (see Table 5).  
4. Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to explore whether performance on a mental state 
attribution task, a measure of social cognition, would predict social performance (i.e. 
social functioning) as reported by parents. Research has shown that children with AS and 
ADHD demonstrate social functioning deficits (APA, 1994), and may also perform more 
poorly than typical children or children with other psychiatric problems on social 
cognition tasks (Buitelaar et al., 1999). More specifically, children with AS have 
demonstrated significant deficits in social cognition (Baron-Cohen & Frith 1985, Baron-
Cohen 1991), while the research on children with ADHD has been less clear (Buitelaar et 
al., 1999; Downs & Smith, 2004).  
 It has been suggested that improvements in social cognition may lead to better 
social functioning (Timler, 2003), however, most of the research has assumed an 
empirical relationship because deficits in both areas exist when children have problems 
with social cognition. In other words, children with AS demonstrate deficits in social 
cognition as well as social functioning, therefore the assumption is that there must be a 
causal relationship. This study attempted to show an empirical link between social 
cognition and social performance using a small sample of two patient populations that 
have deficits in social functioning, but were hypothesized to have differences in social 
cognition abilities.  
 The results of the current study are consistent with previous research and suggests 
that children with AS have deficits in parent reports of social functioning. Significant 
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differences between groups were found on the Vineland-II Socialization Domain. Further 
qualitative exploration revealed that children with AS demonstrated social deficits over 
and above children with ADHD or typically developing children in the areas of 
Interpersonal Relationships (i.e. skills such as responding to others, expressing and 
recognizing emotions, friendship, and belonging to groups) and Play and Leisure skills 
(i.e. skills such as playing as well as sharing and cooperating) only.  
The ADHD and AS groups did not differ on skills such as following rules, using 
manners, apologizing, keeping secrets, controlling impulses, and responsibility, however. 
There was also no difference between groups on the Social Skills Rating Scale (SSRS), 
which includes items similar to the Vineland-II Coping Skills scale such as helping 
others, sharing, and following instructions, initiating behaviors and responding to others, 
communicating with adults, showing concern and respect for others’ feelings, and 
responding appropriately to teasing. Both scales that were not significantly different 
between groups relate to following social norms (e.g. keeping secrets, sharing, and 
responding appropriately) as well as attention and executive functioning (e.g. initiating 
and controlling impulses). Scores on the SSRS and the Vineland-II Coping Skills scale 
were in the Average range for children with ADHD and in the Average to Low Average 
range for children with AS. A very small group of typically developing children scored in 
the Superior range for both measures.  
This finding suggests that children with AS and ADHD serve as good comparison 
groups. Both groups have social functioning deficits, but their pattern of problems differs 
in some areas. It is possible that children with AS and ADHD may overlap in some areas 
of social functioning, but may differ in areas more related to social cognition such as 
38  
interacting and playing with others. The BRIEF Meta-cognition subscale and group 
explained 50% of the variance in SSRS scores, and it is likely that the overlapping social 
deficits may be related to problems with attention and/or executive functioning skills. 
Both children with AS and ADHD have documented symptoms of significant 
inattention and over activity (APA, 1994). The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 1994) lists symptoms 
of over activity and inattention as associated features of AS and prohibits diagnosis of 
ADHD in this population. The manual does recognize the prevalence of these symptoms 
in both populations. Taken together, there is a strong argument for attention and 
executive problems explaining a portion of the overlap in social functioning deficits.  
 In addition to differences in social functioning, the current study found that 
differences between the ADHD and AS groups on a social cognition measure was 
significant. This data also suggested that there is a large effect size for such a small 
sample. Children with AS generally answered about 14 items correctly while children 
with ADHD answered about 17 items correct and typical children answered about 18 
items correct. Unlike the findings in the area of social functioning, children with ADHD 
appear to fall somewhere in between typical children and children with AS when 
analyzing mental state attribution, however more subjects are needed to confirm this 
finding. This finding adds to previous research, which found a trend for significance 
when analyzing differences between children with ADHD and typical children in 
performance on an emotion recognition task (Buitelaar et al., 1999). The results are also 
similar to a study by Downs and Smith (2004), which found that children with 
ADHD/ODD answered significantly fewer questions correct on the emotional 
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understanding tasks overall than nonclinical children, while children with AS showed a 
trend toward the same finding. 
 Age was significantly related to performance on the social cognition task, 
supporting Hypothesis 1b. This finding is consistent with previous studies suggesting that 
social cognition may improve with age (see Kuusikko et al., 2009 for review; Levin Allen 
2008). Due to the limited sample size of this study, further exploration of age and mental 
state attribution or emotion recognition could not be delineated.  
Contrary to predictions, no relationship was found between performance on the Mind 
in the Eyes test and measures of social functioning, therefore hypothesis 2 was not 
supported. Exploratory analysis even revealed a trend toward significance suggesting that 
Mind in the Eyes performance was inversely related to the Vineland-II Interpersonal 
Relationships subscale. This finding was unexpected, but may highlight an important 
point by Bauminger (2002) who suggested that understanding people’s mental states is 
only partially understood in children with autism and, “this knowledge is not 
spontaneously translated into daily social interactions with peers.” In other words, it is 
possible that it is not the ability to label or recognize another’s emotion that relates to 
social functioning, but instead the understanding or practice of what to do with that 
knowledge (i.e. social skills) that can predict social performance. The finding of a weak, 
negative relationship between performance on the Mind in the Eyes task and the 
Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationship scores may also be consistent with research that 
has found that children with AS have difficulty generalizing skills related to emotion 
recognition (Bauminger 2002; Rao et al., 2008). Although this may be a spurious finding, 
it may also be that children who begin to master the ability to mentally attribute are at a 
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loss or even are frustrated by their inability to translate the knowledge into skills that 
would increase their social performance.  
Limitations 
 The results of this study are limited by the following factors. First, the sample size 
(12 children with AS, 10 children with ADHD, and 4 typically developing children) was 
inadequate to detect a relationship should it have existed. The lack of statistical power 
also restricted analysis of interaction effects within the current sample. This resulted in 
The lack of significant findings for the hypotheses may be due to the size and 
characteristics of the sample, which may not have adequately represented the general 
population of those with AS. For example, this study did not contain any female 
participants and subjects were generally recruited from families with upper-middle class 
income levels. In addition, 2 subjects were removed due to performance on the Mind in 
the Eyes task that was extreme compared to the rest of the AS group. With a larger group 
size, differences in performance could have been further explored. Because of these 
factors, these results may not generalize to the entire population of those with AS.  
 Our recruitment method may have also limited the generalization of our findings. 
Due to restrictions in locations for advertisements as well as methods of contacting 
children and families, our study population was primarily recruited from families 
spending significant amounts of time in the CNNH waiting room. Because families 
tended to stay and wait for their children to complete a social skills group, they became 
the group most likely to view our advertisement. As a result, more than half of the 
children in the AS and ADHD groups were participants in the social skills groups 
provided by the CNNH. Although this limits the variability in the current sample, 
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therefore removing the potentially confounding variable of whether or not a child 
received social skills intervention, it does restrict the ability to generalize the results to 
the general population. Given that many children with ADHD either do not participate in 
social skills groups, or participate in social skills groups focused on attention and 
executive related skills, this similarity across groups may have resulted in less variability 
overall, therefore limiting our results.  
The lack of objective neuropsychological testing is also a limitation. Although a 
parent report measure of executive functioning was given to provide a day to day, 
functional measure of executive skills, the behavior report did not analyze problem 
solving skills, inhibition, or impulsivity objectively. It is possible that deficits in these 
skills may have had a negative impact on children’s ability to accurately complete the 
Mind in the Eyes task. Similarly, it is possible that natural neurological development of 
executive skills, rather than improvement in social cognition is related to social 
functioning. Research has shown consistent growth in white matter with age as well as 
increases in gray matter in the frontal lobe that peaks around the age of puberty (i.e. age 
12 for males) (Giedd et al., 1999). It is possible, therefore, that neurological development 
rather than improvements in social cognition is related to improvements in social 
functioning.  
Educational setting as well as our method of analyzing social functioning may 
also be limiting factors. Although the current study did not find a relationship between 
educational setting and parent report measures of social functioning, it is possible that an 
appropriate social setting influenced parents’ view of social performance. In other words, 
parents may be rating social functioning based on the way in which children interact with 
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peers who were similarly delayed rather than typically developing peers. A recent 
literature review (Rao et al., 2008) cited the lack of informed raters as a limitation in 
appropriately measuring social functioning. Future studies should consider including 
multiple informants to obtain a better understanding of social functioning in school or 
with peers.  
In addition, a number of studies on social skills interventions have not found 
significant changes following intervention using the SSRS or other social performance 
ratings as outcome measures, while other, more objective measures of social performance 
have improved (see Rao et al., 2008 for review). For example, one study found 
significant improvement in behavioral observation of play sessions as well as self-
perceived social support from classmates following a social skills intervention, however 
findings were not significant on pre and post SSRS ratings (Barry et al., 2003). Future 
research should focus on developing methods for quantifying social interactions with 
peers in real-word environments. This would shed further light on the relationship 
between emotion recognition and social functioning and eliminate the need to use parent 
and/or teacher reports.  
Finally, the validity of the Mind in the Eyes test could be a limitation. There is 
little research and norms available for the measure. Although the test does demonstrate a 
predictive value for diagnosis based on the current study (i.e. children with AS perform 
more poorly than children with ADHD or controls), it is possible that the test is 
measuring something other than social cognition. The current study also found that both 
group and BRIEF Meta-cognition scores predicted social functioning, whereas the Mind 
in the Eyes task did not. This finding supports the suggestion that executive skills may 
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impact performance on the Mind in the Eyes task and not purely deficits in social 
cognitive abilities. Future research should consider the impact of executive skills when 
assessing social cognition.  
Implications 
 This research has implications, although limited, for both clinical practice and 
future research in the area of social development in children with AS. The finding of a 
possible inverse relationship between mental state attribution and social functioning is 
important when considering the generalization of social skills training. Whereas some 
studies focus purely on training in emotion recognition, clinicians may want to consider 
adding training on how to interact with others once an emotion is recognized into their 
social skills interventions. For example, children with AS could be taught to acknowledge 
another child’s feelings (i.e. active listening) and ask what he or she can do to help should 
a child with AS recognize that someone is frustrated or upset. Previous literature has 
suggested that training programs should include teaching social behavior in addition to 
social cognitive abilities (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995).  
 In terms of research implications, this study adds to the research of emotion 
recognition, specifically labeling facial expressions using eyes, in a pediatric population 
of children with AS and ADHD. This study is one of only a few studies to include 
children with ADHD, and one of two studies to analyze the relationship between children 
with ADHD and AS specifically. While this study did have limited subjects, it is similar 
to the prior study, which included only 9 ADHD participants.  
 Future research needs to be conducted with a larger sample size to investigate the 
hypothesized relationships, as well as to demonstrate the reliability and validity of the 
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Mind in the Eyes task. While removing the limitation of measurement error, this would 
also provide norms for clinical application. This research also has the potential to 
generate hypotheses for future investigations. Future research should, for example, look 
at the understanding of what to do or how to respond to someone when one recognizes 
the emotions of others in addition to a child’s proficiency in emotion recognition in 
general.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 Overall, the results of the current study do not support a relationship between 
social functioning and emotion and cognition recognition. The findings do suggest that 
children with AS and ADHD may have different social functioning in the areas of 
interpersonal skills and play and leisure skills and similar performance in the area of 
coping skills. It is possible that children with AS have problems in social functioning that 
relate to attention and/or executive functioning skills in addition to deficits related more 
to social cognitive abilities. The current study also suggests that future research should 
consider the importance of the generalization of the social skills related to the ability to 
recognize the emotions and cognitions of others.   
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Table 1: Demographic information  
 
Demographic Variables       AS   ADHD  Typicals 
Gender  %, (n) 
Male       100% (12) 100% (10) 100% (4) 
 
Age  
M (SD)     120.83 (17.26) 107.3 (12.55) 117.50 (21.69) 
 
Grade  
 M (SD)     3.83 (1.64) 3.20 (1.14) 3.50 (2.08) 
 
Race  %, (n) 
 Caucasian      92% (11) 90% (9)  100% (4) 
 African American     8% (1)  10% (1) 
 
Educational Setting  %, (n)  
 Regular Education     0% (0)  50% (5)  100% (4) 
 Regular Education with pull out services 8% (1)  30% (3) 
 Regular Education with 1:1 Aide  42% (5)  10% (1) 
 Special Education   42% (5)  10% (1) 
 Home Schooled    8% (1)  0% (0) 
 
IQ %, (n)  
 Low Average    8% (1)  10% (1)  
 Average     84% (10) 30% (3)  50% (2) 
 High Average    0% (0)  40% (4) 
 Superior/ Very Superior   8% (1)  30% (3)  50% (2) 
 
 
 
 
M = mean 
SD = standard deviation 
n = number of participants 
% = percentage 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and t-tests for children with AS, ADHD, and Typicals on variables of interest (NOTE: Typicals not included in analysis) 
 
Variables (Type of Score)     Asperger’s   ADHD  Typicals  t (df)  p effect 
       Disorder   Controls        size 
 (SD)               (SD)                 Cohen’s d 
Vineland-II Socialization (Standard Score)   79.17 (11.75)  97.20 (19.12) 121 (8.52) -2.71 (20) .013 -1.14 
Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationships (V-Score)  10.25 (2.45)  14.50 (3.23) 18 (.82)  -3.64 (20) .002 -1.54 
Vineland-II Coping (V-Score)    13.25 (2.18)  14.10 (3.45) 19 (1.63) -.70 (20)  .490 -0.29 
Vineland-II Play and Leisure Time (V-Score)  10 (2.52)  14.30 (3.47) 17.25 (1.71) -3.37 (20) .003 0.72 
Social Skills Rating Scale (Standard Score)   84.17 (17.60)  96.10 (21.21) 127.50 (5) -1.44 (20) .164 -0.61 
*Mind in the Eyes (Total Correct)    14.25 (3.25)  17.10 (3.73) 18.25 (2.75) -1.92 (20) .035 -0.81 
 
 = mean 
SD = standard deviation 
df – degrees of freedom 
* One-tailed t-test was conducted for the Mind in the Eyes test 
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Table 3: Correlations  
Variable      SSRS Total           BRIEF    BRIEF         Age      
          Social Skills       Behavior Regulation      Metacognition    
            r,p        r,p          r,p          r,p 
 
Vineland-II Socialization    .80, p<.001  -.36, ns  -.22, ns -.20, ns 
Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationships   .75, p<.001  -.30, ns  -.14, ns -.33, ns 
Vineland-II Coping     .75, p <.001  -.22, ns  -.33, ns .10, ns  
Vineland-II Play and Leisure Time   .74, p <.001  -.45, p = .04  -.12 ns  -.28, ns 
SSSRS Total Social Skills         -   -.39, ns  -.54, p < .05 .22, ns 
Mind in the Eyes          -       -      -  .70, p < .01  
        
 
SSRS Total Social Skills = Social Skills Rating Scale Total Social Skills 
BRIEF = Behavior Regulation Inventory of Executive Functioning 
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Table 4: Multiple Stepwise Regressions table for hypothesis testing 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Vineland – II Socialization Domain 
     R² F B SE Beta  t p   
Step 1:  
 Group      18.03 6.64 .52 2.72 .01* 
     .27 7.38 
      
 
Step 2:  
 Group      20.50 7.27 .59 2.82 .01 
 Mind in the Eyes     -.86 1.01 -.18 -.86 .40  
    .30         4.01 
 
Note. ΔR2=.03 for Step 2 
 
 
Hypothesis 2b: SSRS Total Social Skills 
     R² F B SE Beta  t p   
Step 1:  
 Group      18.29 6.48 .547 2.82 .01*  
  BRIEF Metacognition    -1.18 .30 -.66 -3.97 .001* 
     .50 9.67 
      
 
Step 2:  
 Group      19.20 7.40 .49 2.60 .01* 
 BRIEF Metacognition    -1.20 .31 -.67 -3.82 .001 
Mind in the Eyes     -.28 1.00 -.05 -.28 .78  
    .51         6.16 
 
Note. ΔR2=.002 for Step 2 
 
 
 
SSRS Total Social Skills = Social Skills Rating Scale Total Social Skills 
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Table 5: Partial Correlations for mind in the eyes performance and dependent variables 
controlling for age and group 
 
Variables            Mind in the Eyes    
  r,  p  Mean (SD)  
      
Vineland-II Socialization   -.29, ns  87.36 (17.71)  
Vineland-II Interpersonal Relationships  -.41, .07  12.18 (3.43)  
Vineland-II Coping   -.18, ns  13.64 (2.79)  
Vineland-II Play and Leisure Time  -.30, ns  11.95 (3.65)  
SSRS Total Social Skills   -.25, ns  89.59 (19.80)  
 
      
SSRS Total Social Skills = Social Skills Rating Scale Total Social Skills 
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Figure 1: Development of theory of mind time line 
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Figure 2: Revised version of the mind in the eyes test 
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Figure 3: Social Functioning and BRIEF scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Mind in the Eyes Performance 
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Figure 5: Correlation between Mind in the Eyes and Age 
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Appendix 1: Eligibility form 
 
Eligibility Form for ______________________ 
 
Have you diagnosed this child with AS?     No  Yes  
 
Have you diagnosed this child with ADHD?     No  Yes  
 
Is this child between the ages of 7 and 12? No  Yes  
 
Did this child pass his or her last physical completed by a medical   No  Yes  
doctor? 
 
Does this child have any health issues that would interfere with the  Yes No  
study? (For example other psychological diagnoses  
or medical limitations?) 
 
Has this child been diagnosed with any other psychological disorder? Yes No 
 
Does this child have a significant visual impairment or hearing  Yes No  
problem that would significantly impact his or her ability to  
understand and respond to questions? 
 
Has this child been diagnosed with a significant    Yes No  
impairment which would impact his or her ability to  
understand the questions we would as him or her? 
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